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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
II. METHODS OF DETECTING DECEPTION*
FRED E. INBAUt
A. The "Lie-detector":
Long before psychologists ever attempted to develop a scientific
technique for detecting deception, persons of average intelligence
*An extended discussion concerning the "word-association" test is pur-
posely omitted in this paper for the reason (1) that its status has not been
judicially determined, and also (2) because of the fact that it does not seem
to possess the encouraging possibilities of a "lie-detector" or a "truth-serum,"
since the "word-association" test only indicates a consciousness of guilt, where-
as the other two methods may reveal the lie itself. (The purpose of discussing
hypnotism is due mainly to the fact that the question has been passed upon
by the courts, rather than because of any special merits of hypnotism itself,
as will be discussed later.)
The technique in conducting the "word-association" test consists of giving
the subject certain stimulus words, one at a time, to which he must respond
by speaking the first word that comes to his mind. Among the words given
there are a few crucial (pertaining to the crime) and many more non-crucial
(irrelevant). The nature of the response word and also the time reaction
(there being some method used for accurately timing the interval between
stimulus and response) are both significant in determining whether or not
there is a consciousness of guilt. For detailed information see Muensterberg,
On the Witness Stand (1909, 1923); Marston, "Reaction-Time Symptoms of
Deception," 3 Jour. of Experimental Psychology 72 (1918) ; ibid., "Negative
Type Reaction-Time Symptoms of Deception," 32 Psychological Rev. 241
(1925); Langfeld, "Psychophysical Symptoms of Deception," 15 Jour. of Ab-
normal Psychology 319 (1920) ; Goldstein, "Reaction Times and the Conscious-
ness of Deception," 34 Am. Jour. of Psychology 562 (1923); Crossland, "The
Psychological Methods of Word-Association and Reaction-Time as Tests of
Deception." 1 Psychology Series, University of Oregon Publications No. 1
(1929); Spencer, "Methods of Detecting Guilt: Word Association, Reaction-
Time Method," 8 Ore. L. Rev. 158 (1929); Wigmore, Principles of Judicial
Proof 621 et seq. (1931). For an interesting discussion of Professor Muenster-
berg's criticism of the legal profession's refusal to utilize this test, see Wig-
more, "Professor Muensterberg and the Psychology of Testimony," 3 Ill. L.
Rev. 399 (1909).
tResearch Assistant in Legal Psychology, Scientific Crime Detection Lab-
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must have observed the fact that conscious lying ordinarily produces
certain emotional disturbances-such as blushing, squinting of eyes,
squirming, peculiar monotone of the voice, throat pulsation, cold
sweat, and a host of other manifestations.
These phenomena were not merely observed and then set apart
for psychological theorizing. They actually played, and still play, an
important role in practical affairs-especially so in our judicial sys-
tem. Every judge and every jury-perhaps unknowingly-gives con-
siderable weight to the physical reactions when an accused person
or a witness is giving testimony in the trial of a case. And this has
received judicial sanction. A court may even go so far as to instruct
the jury that in determining the credibility which should be accorded
to the testimony of a defendant in a criminal case they may take into
consideration his demeanor and conduct both upon the witness stand
and during the trial.' Moreover, it is very generally held that the
conduct, demeanor, and words of one charged with crime, about the
time of its commission or of its discovery, or upon his arrest for or
upon his accusation of it, are admissible as evidence against him.
2
It is apparent, therefore, that the notion of detecting deception by
utilizing certain psycho-physiological principles is not entirely new.5
In their efforts to develop an accurate and reliable "lie-detector,"
oratory, Northwestern University School of Law. Raymond Fellow in Crim-
inal Law, Northwestern University School of Law (1932-1933).
"'We know it to be a fact, grounded in human nature, that the conduct
of a defendant or a party to a suit during the trial is more or less potential,
and has necessarily more or less weight with the court and jury upon the
question of his credibility. . . . If this be so, we fail to perceive the vice
in an instruction telling the jury that they may do the very thing which com-
mon experience and common observation teach that the human mind inevitably
will do." Boykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 Pac. 419 (1896). See 1 Wigmore,
Evidence (2d ed. 1923) §274. Contra: Purdy v. People, 140 Ill. 50, 29 N. E.
700 (1892).
2"Any indications of a consciousness of guilt by a person suspected of
or charged with crime, or who may after such indications be suspected or
charged, are admissible evidence against him. The number of such indica-
tions it is impossible to limit, nor can their nature or character be defined."
McAdory v. State, 62 Ala. 154, 159 (1878). "From our knowledge of the
human mind and its workings, we expect, with almost positive certainty, that
when it is the sole repository of so dreadful a secret it will affect the conduct
'and sayings of the person; hence the mind naturally looks to these with the
most anxious scrutiny, and would require for its satisfaction, if such a thing
were possible, a complete transcript of the person's conduct and sayings ... .
See 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) §273.
3There is an age-old practice in the Orient of requesting an accused per-
son to chew rice and then spit it out for examination-and if the rice is dry
the suspect is considered guilty, because his fear of guilt is supposed to in-
hibit the secretion of saliva. In India the movement of the suspect's big toe
is supposed to be an indication of deception. See Larson, "The Berkeley Lie
Detector and Other Deception Tests," 49 Am. B. Ass'n Rep. 619 (1922), 40
Medico-Legal Jour. 14 (1923).
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scientific investigators have obtained the most encouraging and satis-
factory results from experimentation regarding the symptomatic
changes in respiration and blood pressure.
Lombroso is reputed to have been the first to experiment with
the heart-beat in an effort to determine the guilt or innocence of a
suspect.4  But perhaps the real step toward the development of a
deception test is found in the efforts of Benussi5 who detected sig-
nificant changes in the inspiration-expiration ratio of the person under
interrogation.6 Since then the further study of scientific methods for
detecting deception, based upon the cardiac changes suggested by
Lombroso and the respiratory changes noted by Benussi, has been
carried on in this country-principally by W. M. Marston, John A.
Larson, and Leonarde Keeler.
Keeler, who perfected the "lie-detector" known as the Keeler
Polygraph (the most reliable instrument up to this time), 7 and who
is at present Assistant Professor of Law (in Legal Psychology) at
the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory of Northwestern Uni-
versity, has conducted approximately ten thousand deception tests
4Larson, Lying and Its Detection (1932) 172. For a brief history of the
development of deception tests in general see an excellent article by Professor
C. T. McCormick, in which he made a thorough survey of this subject up to
1926: McCormick, "Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence," 15 Cal. L.
Rev. 484 (1927), 6 Tenn. L. Rev. 108 (1928), 2 Am. J. Police Sci. 388 (1931).
It is interesting to note that Benvenuto Cellini records in his autobiography
the following observation concerning his father: "I was ill about two months,
during which time my father had me most kindly treated and cured, always
repeating that it seemed to him a thousand years -till I got well again, in
order that he might hear me play a little. But when he talked to me of music
with his fingers on my pulse, seeing he had some acquaintance with medicine
and Latin learning, he felt it change so much if he approached that topic,
that he was often dismayed and left my side in tears."
5See Benussi, V., "die Atmungsymptome der Luge," 31 Archiv ffir der
Gesamte Psychologie 244 (1914).
8Professor Burtt of Ohio State University confirmed these fin 4 ings and
also made further studies of deception. He states, however, that the changes
in quantitative systolic blood pressure are the most important criteria. See
Burtt, Legal Psychology (1931). In this connection see Landis and Gullette,
"Studies of Emotional Reactions (III.) Systolic Blood Pressure and Inspira-
tion-Expiration Ratios," 5 Jour. of Comparative Psychology 221 (1925).
"See Larson, "The Use of the Polygraph in the Study of Deception"
(Department of Public Welfare Publication, Illinois, Series No. 104, at p. 6)
(1927). Also see Larson, Lying and Its Detection (1932) xv. Mention should
be made of the fact that there are only about ten such instruments now in
use. However, practically every university psychology laboratory has what is
usually labeled a "lie-detector"-a galvanometer. (See note 9.) Frequently
amateurish experimentation with such an instrument accounts for the un-
favorable newspaper comments to the effect that there is no means for de-
tecting deception. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the catch-word "lie-
detector" was ever used, without any qualification to distinguish one type of
instrument from another.
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within the past eleven years. (In the last three he has been assisted
by Charles M. Wilson.)
The instrument consists of three units: one for recording respira-
tory changes; another for continuously recording the pulse wave and
blood-pressure; and a third for recording a duplicate blood-pressure-
pulse curve or for recording muscular reflexes of the arm or leg.
(Ordinarily only the first two units are used; the third serving merely
as an accessory.)
For obtaining these bodily reactions, a rubber tube (pneumo-
graph) is placed around. the chest, and a blood-pressure cuff, of the
type ordinarily used by physicians, is fastened about the upper arm
and then inflated to a pressure about midway between the systolic and
diastolic blood pressures. Rubber tubes of approximately one
quarter of an inch in diameter lead from both the pneumograph and
the cuff into metal tambours to which are attached two stiluses. At
the tip of each stilus is a small cup which is kept filled with ink and
which feeds the pens as they fluctuate with each pulse beat or respira-
tory movement. The recordations are made upon slowly moving
graph paper driven by a small synchronous electric motor.8
An instrument of this type should be distinguished from the
numerous other so-called "lie-detectors" frequently found in the psy-
chology departments of many universities. Usually such experimental
devices consist of a galvanometer and Wheatstone bridge-an instru-
ment for observing the psycho-galvanic reflex, that is, the changes in
skin resistance to an imperceptible current of electricity flowing
through the subject's body during the period of questioning. The
galvanometric change in the body serves as an extremely sensitive
criterion for emotionality, but cannot by itself be depended upon as
a means for the detection of deception. Used, however, in conjunc-
tion with the other two reactions (blood-pressure and respiration),
it may be of considerable assistance. The new Polygraph will con-
tain this unit in addition to the others previously mentioned.9
Physiological irregularities, such as high blood pressure, etc., or
emotional instability caused by worry or psychological strain, do not
interfere with the deception test, because these factors are ascer-
For more detailed description see Keeler, "A Method for Detecting De-
ception," 1 Am. J. Police Sci. 38 (1930).
9A "lie-detector" must record two or more bodily changes, for no one
known change can be depended upon to give true and significant responses to
deception. The psycho-galvanic reflex is a valuable indicator in many cases,
but results with it alone cannot be relied upon. The blood pressure, pulse,
and respiration are indispensable responses if we are to get a reliable cross-
section of psycho-physical reactions. A record of the combination of all three
bodily variations is most desirable for detecting deception.
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tained in the "control" part of the record.' In other words, that
part of the record made by the subject while being asked the few
customary irrelevant questions (e. g., have you had breakfast this
morning?)'1 will indicate the physiological and psychological peculiari-
ties of the particular individual. Significance is attached only to
the deviations from the "norm" at the points where the subject is
being interrogated as to his participation in the crime under investi-
gation.
Within the past three years approximately forty-five Chicago
banks have availed themselves of the "lie-detector" as an aid in de-
tecting embezzlement among employees, and also for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not a prospective employee has been guilty
of any previous unknown irregularities under former employers. The
results so obtained by members of the Scientific Crime Detection
Laboratory staff have been extremely interesting and most gratifying
-to the investigators and to the banks as well.
In the banks where all employees, from president to jani-
tor, have been examined for the first time, the polygraph records
of from ten to twenty-five per cent of the personnel have indicated
deception in the answers to questions pertaining to the taking of
' 0There should be a qualification to the foregoing statement which, per-
haps, may be adequately explained by the following illustration: In the recent
Wynekoop murder case in Chicago, the police had grilled an elderly woman
suspect, Dr. Alice Wynekoop, for about seventy hours, at the end of which
time. a member of the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory staff was called
upon to make a "lie-detector" test upon the suspect. A test was made, but
the operator found the subject in a weakened condition and with a blood
pressure of about two hundred and twenty. Because of this fact he refused
to make public any statement concerning the results so obtained, until he
could make another test under more favorable conditions-after the suspect
had received some undisturbed rest. The police then placed her in a cell,
supposedly for the purpose of rest and sleep, but actually as bait for news-
paper reporters and photographers. They then requested another test, which
was refused by the operator, because of non-compliance with his request
regarding the period of rest and quiet. Hence the unfavorable newspaper
reports to the effect that "Dr. Wynekoop thwarts the 'lie-detector'." See news-
paper accounts in Chicago papers from November 21, 1933, until December 11,
1933.
It should also be stated that the instrument's reliability is restricted to
cases involving conscious deception. In other words, it is of little value in
cases involving pathological lying-such as the case of a paretic who speaks
of his millions, etc. See Larson, The Cardio-Pneumo-Psychogram in Decep-
tion, 6 Jour. of Experimental Psychology 420 (1923).
"All questions are so framed that they may be answered by "yes" or
"no." The reason for this is obvious, because any speaking by the subject
will interfere with the recording of the otherwise normal automatic respira-
tion and heart-beat, and thereby impair the recording of the variations caused
by emotional disturbances due to conscious lying. Before each test the sub-
ject is cautioned to refrain from conversing, and merely answer by either
"Yes" or "no"-reserving his explanations until the completion of the test.
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money from the institutions or from customers. And practically
all such records have been substantiated by admissions of the sub-
jects themselves.
In one instance a bank desired to have polygraph tests made upon
its fifty-six employees in an effort to detect the embezzler of a sum
of five thousand dollars. Instead of finding one liar in the group,
twelve were discovered. Of these twelve, nine confessed to em-
bezzlements heretofore unknown to the bank officials.1
2
Six bank applicants were sent to the Laboratory recently for
polygraph tests to determine whether or not they had been guilty of
converting to their own use any money or property belonging to
previous employers. Only one of the six ran a clear record on the
instrument. The other five gave specific responses indicating de-
ception in their answers to such questions, and each of these admitted
having diverted various sums of money plus other miscellaneous
articles.
Not every bank employee or bank applicant with a guilty record
is dismissed from the institution or refused employment. The indi-
vidual who admits all his irregular practices is usually retained, or
employed, even in many cases where substantial sums are involved.13
Past experience lends support to the theory that such an employee
is a "good risk," not only because of the beneficial psychological ef-
fect accruing from the admissions but also because he is aware of
the fact that within another six months or a year he will be subjected
to another similar test, the outcome of which must be favorable in
order for him to retain his position in the institution.
The Chicago Police Force only occasionally requests the assist-
ance of the "lie-detector," although such Laboratory service was
formerly offered free of charge to the law-enforcing agencies of that
city.14 Neighboring communities, however, frequently solicit the aid
12Recently in one of Chicago's largest banks, several individuals were
examined regarding the disappearance of a small sum of money. One of
those whose record indicated deception in his answers to pertinent questions
finally confessed to taking four thousand five hundred dollars, two thousand
two hundred of which was from a charity fund-"tag day" money cans, which
this particular subject had opened for the purpose of counting the money and
depositing it to the account of the charitable organization involved.
-After any admissions, further polygraph tests are made to determine
whether or not the subject continues to withhold information as to his dis-
honest practices. When complete confessions are made the polygraph records
are usually free from specific responses.
14Several police captains have developed considerable respect for the in-
strument because of the results obtained in cases arising in their particular
districts. However, the general attitude of the Chicago police department
toward the "lie-detector" is quite clearly depicted in the following incident.
At the time of the Wickersham investigation a leading police official was
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of this instrument. Only recently, at Rock Island, Illinois, a large
number of persons were quizzed in an effort to determine the slayer
of a young girl. The evidence against any one of the suspects was
not more than that against the others. All of them were tested
upon the "lie-detector," and the records obtained indicated deception
on the part of but one of the suspects. Before arrangements could
be made for his arrest, this particular individual became a fugitive
from justice by leaving town that very day. Some two weeks later
he surrendered, and thereupon confessed his guilt. He was tried,
convicted, and sentenced to ninety years in the state penitentiary. 5
In another rather interesting case, 16 two suspects of a bank rob-
bery were tested at the request of their attorneys. The records se-
cured were clear and not indicative of any deception. At the trial
of these two men, permission was obtained from the judge to call a
night session with the jury absent, in order to have a demonstration
of the test and to receive the testimony of both Keeler and Larson.
As was expected, however, the prosecuting attorney objected to the
introduction of the testimony, on the ground that such would be a
usurpation of the function of the jury. The objection was sustained
and the trial proceeded as usual. Three witnesses were placed on
the stand who swore that they saw the defendants commit the crime.
Two days later the real bank robbers were apprehended elsewhere
and they confessed to this particular robbery. Naturally, the inno-
cent defendants were released. And from that time on the prosecut-
ing attorney in the case has come to have considerable confidence in
the "lie-detector." He, himself, later called upon Keeler for his
assistance in a murder case, in which the suspect whose record indi-
cated deception confessed to the crime in question.'7
asked why he neglected to use the "lie-detector" in his investigations, to which
he replied (with a display of his clenched fist): "Here is the best lie-
detector." See Report No. 11 of the National Commission on Law Observance
and Enforcement: Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931) 130. A com-
ment is there made to the following effect: "The presence in Chicago of
this Laboratory, with its many scientific facilities, ought in time to stimulate
the local prosecuting attorneys and detectives to place an increasing reliance
on the investigation of outside evidence of crimes instead of the extortion of
confessions by brutal methods."
'5See newspaper accounts of this case, and of the part played by the
"lie-detector," in the "Chicago Herald and Examiner" of February 19, 1933;
the "Chicago Herald and Examiner" for May 9, 1933, and the "Chicago Daily
Tribune" for May 10, 1933. Also see complete account in the American Weekly
section of Hearst's newspapers of June 11, 1933. The defendant was 'Maurice
Meyer and the victim Rose Gendler. The "lie-detector" evidence was not used
at the trial, however. See "Davenport Democrat" for April 18, 1933.
'8 See report in Larson, Lying and Its Detection (1932) 349.
'7Another interesting case in which Keeler participated was the one
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Although no claim is made as to the infallibility of the Polygraph
deception test technique, statistical data definitely establish the fact
that it is an extremely valuable method for establishing guilt or in-
nocence. In experimental cases, the outcome of which is of no im-
portance to the individual being tested, there is an accuracy of approx-
mately eighty-five per cent. And frequently in those instances where
no significant response is given, if a monetary wager is made with
the subject that his lie can be detected (i. e., chosen card, chosen
number, etc.), the existence of this "stake" will cause a significant
response to be recorded on the instrument. In criminal cases, statis-
tical data are difficult to obtain. For instance, in cases where a sus-
pect's Polygraph record contains significant responses indicating his
guilt, but no substantiating or discrediting evidence is ever obtained
by the police, and no admissions are made by the suspect himself,
such a record will remain "an unknown quantity" as far as statistical
data are concerned. Nevertheless, in numerous criminal cases, full
confessions have been obtained in approximately seventy-five per
cent of those in which the record indicated deception regarding the
pertinent questions propounded of the suspect.
It must be remembered that the successful use of any such device
depends largely upon the skill of the operator in selecting the ques-
tions propounded and in correlating the emotional responses. This is
-something an untrained individual cannot do. And for that reason
Professor Keeler has attempted to limit the distribution of the instru-
ment to individuals who have demonstrated their ability as operators
and who are either reputable members of the medical profession, or
officially connected with educational institutions or recognized law
centered about the trial of Virgil Kirkland at Valparaiso, Indiana, in 1931.
Kirkland was accused of a rape and murder. He was tried, convicted, and
sentenced to death. Upon appeal the conviction was reversed on the ground
of insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. Prior to the second
trial, defense counsel procured the services of Mr. Keeler. He tested Kirkland
on the "lie-detector" and the record indicated Kirkland's innocence of the
major charges of the crime. At the trial Keeler was called as a witness and
he proceeded to testify before counsel for the prosecution objected. The ob-
jection was sustained. Nevertheless, on mdtion of defense counsel, the jury
was removed from the court room and the judge heard testimony regarding
the "lie detector." Any further "lie-detector" testimony was withheld from the
jury. The verdict upon this second trial amounted merely to a conviction of
assault and battery with intent to commit rape, and the defendant was sen-
tenced to the state penitentiary for one to ten years. Observers have stated
that the fact that the defense offered to prove, and was deprived of the right
to prove, the truthfulness of the defendant's testimony by means of the "lie-
detector" had considerable weight in the jury's deliberations. See newspaper
accounts of this case in, the "Chicago Herald and Examiner" of May 21, 22,
1931.
POLICE SCIENCE
enforcing agencies. An instrument of this nature in the hands of an
unscrupulous individual is an extremely dangerous thing.
Decisions.
In a federal case decided in 1923, Frye v. United States,8 the
defendant, on trial for murder, offered as evidence the testimony
of W. M. Marston concerning the result of a deception test made up-
on the defendant by use of the "systolic blood pressure" method.
The testimony was excluded by the trial court and upon appeal the
decision was affirmed. The following extract from the opinion of the
appellate court represents a truly intelligent treatment of a problem
of this nature:
"Just when a scientific principle of discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recog-
nized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
"We think that the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet
gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting evidence
deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far
made."19
Three years after this decision, in 1926, Professor C. T. Mc-
Cormick"0 sent questionnaires to various members of the American
Psychological Association in an effort to ascertain their opinions upon
the question of whether or not the results of the deception tests
based upon the measurement of the word-association reaction time,
respiratory changes, and blood pressure were of sufficient accuracy
to warrant consideration by judges and jurors in determining the
credibility of testimony given in court. Of those who replied, eighteen
answered yes, with varying qualifications (e. g., if handled by an
18293 Fed. 1013, 34 A. L. R. 145 (D. C., 1923).
19Ibid. pp. 1014; 146. "The attitude of the court in this case seems beyond
all criticism. It will not do to declare dogmatically that there is no good in
a new thing, and it will not do, particularly in a capital case, to let scientific
theories as yet unproved to disturb the scales. The court displayed a proper
caution, yet left an open door for the 'coming light."' 28 Law Notes 64
(1924). See notes on this case in 24 Col. L. Rev. 430 (1924); 37 Harv. L.
Rev. 1138 (1924) ; 2 N. Y. L. Rev. 162 (1924) ; 33 Yale L. J. 771 (1924).
20At that time Professor of Law, North Carolina University, and now
Professor of Law at Northwestern University.
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expert only), thirteen answered no, and seven were of doubtful
classification.
Since 1926 considerable progress has been made in the field of
detecting deception.22 But no one is yet prepared to assert that even
the most advanced method for detecting deception is infallible. How-
ever, perfection is not a prerequisite to judicial recognition. Professor
Wigmore, in discussing scientific evidence in general, has stated that
"All that should be required as a condition is the preliminary testi-
mony of a scientist that the proposed test is an accepted one in his pro-
fession and that it has a reasonable measure of precision in its indica-
tions."23
No one, at least for some time to come, will advocate that
"lie-detector" evidence alone sustain a conviction. But, as a
test of credibility of either the accused or of a witness, it might well
serve as a link in the chain of circumstances indicating guilt or in-
nocence. This suggestion finds ample support in the present prac-
tice of admitting evidence that blood hounds have followed a trail
from the scene of a crime to the whereabouts of the accused, 24 of
evidence of similarity of foot-marks,2 and of conduct to show in-
sanity2 6-- "all striking examples of the fact that the conclusiveness
in the inference called for by the evidence is not a requirement for
admissibility."
2 7
The use of a "lie-detector" in court, or the admission of testi-
mony concerning tests conducted before trial, involves a consideration
of certain privileges guaranteed an accused by both federal and state
constitutions. This problem was raised in the recent Wisconsin case
of State v. Bohner,2s which rejected the offer of defense counsel to
introduce "lie-detector" testimony as to the truthfulness of the de-
fendant's alibi.
The opinion of the appellate court in the Bohner case contains
a quotation from defense counsel's brief, to the effect that the de-
fendant offered to prove "by Prof. Leonarde Keeler, of the North-
21See McCormick, "Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence," 15 Cal. L.
Rev. 484, 495 (1927).
22 The years from 1930 have witnessed the greatest strides along this line.
232 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923), §990. (Italics added.)*24State v. Adams, 85 Kan. 435, 116 Pac. 608, 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 870
(1911); State v. King, 144 La. 430, 80 So. 615 (1919). See also 8 R. C. L.
§177 (1915).25People v. Breen, 192 Mich. 39, 158 N. W. 142 (1916); State v. McLeod,
198 N. C. 649 (1930), and see note on this case in 5 Temple L. Q. 144 (1930).
201 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 23 at §228 et seq.
27McCormick, op. cit. supra note 21 at p. 500.
28246 N. W. 314 (Jan. 10, 1933).
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western University Crime Detection Laboratory, of Chicago, Illinois,
by a test upon the defendant and with his instrument known as the
'lie detector' that the defendant was not in the city of Tomah on the
date of the robbery and was not guilty." -9 This language has con-
veyed the impression that Mr. Keeler actually conducted the tests,
and that he participated in the trial of the case. As a matter of
fact, however, he did not test the defendant. The extent of his
participation consists of correspondence with defense counsel, in
which Mr. Keeler consented merely to examine the defendant
and to render a report to defendant's counsel. Moreover, Mr.
Keeler advised and requested that no attempt be made to in-
troduce evidence either as to his willingness to conduct the test or as
to any report he might render upon the result of the test-it being
thought advisable to await a more favorable opportunity to seek
judicial recognition of such evidence, and at a time when more com-
plete data and information could be presented for the court's con-
sideration. Nevertheless, the present decision represents a refusal to
admit "lie-detector" evidence in a criminal proceeding.
The constitutional law aspect of "lie-detector" testimony was not
mentioned in the Frye case, but in the Bohner case the Wisconsin
court considered this phase of the problem in addition to the other
involving the admissibility of scientific evidence "not yet generally
accepted in its own particular field."
"While it [the 'lie-detector'] may have some utility at present, and
may ultimately be of great value in the administration of justice, it must
not be overlooked that a too hasty acceptance of it during this stage of
its development may bring complications and abuses that will overbalance
whatever utility it may be assumed to have. The present necessity for
elaborate exposition of its theory and demonstration of its practical work-
ing, in order to convince the jury of its probative tendencies, together
with the possibility of attacks upon the soundness of its underlying theory
and its practical usefulness, may easily result in a trial of the lie de-
tector rather than the issues in the cause. If the defendant in a criminal
case is to be permitted to have tests taken outside of court and then to
introduce expert testimony as to the results of the tests when these are
favorable to him, without the necessity of taking the stand or submitting
to tests by the prosecution, the way would seem to be open to abuses that
would not promote the cause of justice. It is our conclusion that the
refusal of the trial court to admit this testimony was not error. 3
0
The objection raised by the Wisconsin court in the foregoing
29246 N. W. 317.
80Ibid. p. 317. In support of its position that the evidence was not suffi-
ciently reliable for use in criminal trials the court quoted from Wigmore's
"Principles of Judicial Proof" (2d ed. 1931) 634, wherein the author summar-
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case as to the undue advantage which would thus be given a de-
fendant under such conditions is easily met by the suggestion that
whenever a defendant seeks to introduce testimony of this nature he
will be considered as having waived his privilege of refraining from
taking the witness stand. Another way to handle the situation, where
the accused wants to subject himself to the test, and perhaps one
more desirable, is (1) to require defense counsel to make an applica-
tion to the court for an order that the test be made in the presence
of attorneys for both prosecution and defense, and (2) for the court
to attach a condition that the report of the expert conducting the
test be admitted in its entirety, whether favorable or unfavorable-
thus constituting a complete waiver of the defendant's privileg.e
against self-incrimination. This also would meet the objection voiced
by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
Where the suspected individual refuses to submit to the test, his
constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination may seem to afford
him protection against a compulsory examination. And yet, upon the
analogy of several other types of cases there should be no valid ob-
jection on this ground. For instance, an accused person may be
compelled to stand up in court for the purpose of identification;81 to
ized his preceding discussion of all sorts of experimental psychometric methods
of ascertaining data for valuing testimonial evidence-such as the "word-
association" test, the "truth-serum" tests, etc. The court inferred that Pro-
fessor Wigmore offered "little comfort to one who contends that this device is
past the experimental stage." As a matter of fact, Professor Wigmore de-
voted considerable space in his book to a discussion of the "lie-detector," and
his attitude, both as indicated in his work and as expressed to the writer re-
cently, is far from discouraging. Moreover, Professor Wigmore has been
criticized for being "a little uncritical in his acceptance of these recent de-
vices," and for not showing that "finger-prints, bullet marks, scopolamine, and
lie detectors are also fallible tests." See book review by Professor Chafee
of Wigmore's "Principles of Judicial Proof" in 80 Pa. L. Rev. 319, 322 (1931).
Incidentally, Professor Chafee objected to Wigmore's omission of any mention
of Whedde & Beffel's "Finger-prints Can Be Forged," but Professor Chafee
himself did not mention the fact that both authors of this book are ex-
convicts, and that an investigating committee of the International Association
of Identification discredited the assertions made by Whedde and Beffel. Pro-
fessor Chafee also stated in his review that "the Wickersham Commission has
reported a Washington case where an injtinction was issued against scopola-
mine injection and the use of the lie detector." But, as indicated by the follow-
ing quotation, there is nothing in the injunction decree which discredits the
"lie-detector": "It is not for this court (Superior Court of Washington) at
this time to pass on the abstract question of whether the use of this par-
ticular machine under any circumstances would be illegal and would be pro-
hibited by the court. The issue here is whether or not the treatment ac-
corded to the defendant, Meyer, between the 14th of November and the 21st
of November at the hands of the officers of the law having him in charge was
illegal and improper, and whether it should be permanently restrained." See
Report No. 11 of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforce-
ment: Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931) 151, 152.
31People v. Gardner (1894) 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 1003, 28 L. R. A. 699.
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place his feet in a suitable position for view by the jury;32 to make
footmarks for comparison with those found at the scene of the
crime;33 to make finger-prints for the same purpose ;34 to submit to
a physical examination for scars or wounds ;3 to exhibit certain tatoo
marks to the jury."8 "Lie-detector" evidence is of a nature similar to
that used in the foregoing cases. The instrument merely records the
reactions in a subject's blood pressure and respiration when asked
questions pertinent to the crime under investigation. (The record
is precisely the same even though the subject remains silent instead of
replying by the usual "yes" or "no.")37 Therefore, in view of the
fact (1) that lay testimony is admissible concerning the physiological
and psychological reactions of a person accused of or while being
tried for a criminal offense,3 8 and (2) that compulsory submission to
a "lie-detector" test does not provoke "compulsory testimony" (as-
suming, of course, the validity of the analogy to the decisions men-
tioned above), it would seem that an accused individual may be forced
to submit to the examination. The evidence thus obtained could be
presented to a court by either (or both) of two methods. A qualified
expert might testify as to the recorded reactions and his interpre-
tation thereof, or else the polygraph record could be presented to
the court with merely an explanation by the expert as to what phy-
siological changes, if any, occurred during the interrogation. 9
At the present time no one is compelled to submit to the Poly-
graph test. Consequently, if the art of detecting deception by this
method is recognized, evidence obtained as the result of a volun-
tary submission would not in any way violate the defendant's con-
stitutional privilege, and therefore would be admissible in court.
32State v. Prudhomme (1873) 25 La. Ann. 522.
3Biggs v. State (1929) 201 Ind. 200, 167 N. E. 129, 64 A. L. R. 1085.
3People v. Sallow (1917) 100 Misc. 447, 165 N. Y. Supp. 915.
50'Brien v. State (1890) 125 Ind. 38, 25 N. E. 137, 9 L. R. A. 323.
86State v. Al Chueg (1879) 14 Nev. 79, 33 Am. Rep. 530.
37In a recent murder case, the accused refused to reply to stimulus ques-
tions when tested on the "lie-detector." Despite this, however, his specific re-
actions indicated his guilt. This was corroborated by other evidence, includ-
ing the confessions of two accessories who also had been subjected to the tests
and later confessed their guilt as participants. The principal was sentenced to
life imprisonment. See State v. Miller court records in New Philadelphia, Ohio.38Supra notes 1 and 2.
89For practical and administrative reasons it seems more desirable to
utilize the methods outlined above, rather than attempt to conduct the test in
open court. The nature of the test is such that laboraory conditions are re-
quired for the best results. The confusion attendant to a court trial, the undue
consumption of the tribunal's time, the undesirability of thus compelling an
expert to make a hasty conclusion, constitutes some of the major reasons why
the better practice would be to have the test administered before trial, and the
results used only in the form of the opinion testimony of an expert reporting
and interpreting them. See McCormick, op. cit. supra note 21 at p. 501.
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The foregoing discussion concerning the constitutionality of "lie-
detector" evidence assumes, for this purpose, judicial recognition of
the science as such. That, of course, is the first step. And eventually
data and information concerning the high degree of accuracy of the
most advanced method for detecting deception will be presented to
the courts for their consideration in determining its judicial status
as evidence of guilt or innocence. For that reason, consideration
was here given to the possible methods by which a court could admit
the evidence without violating the constitutional safeguard against
self-incrimination, and also without prejudicing the cause of the
prosecution.
B. The "Truth-serum":
The possibility of the existence of a "truth-serum" may be ap-
preciated readily by anyone who has observed the frankness usually
exhibted by an intoxicated, individual.
Various drugs are capable of producing a mental state in which
consciousness is more or less profoundly affected, thereby rendering
a suspect's reactions somewhat automatic. In this condition a per-
son is supposedly unable to survey critically his responses to questions,
and as a consequence truth is forthcoming rather than deception.
Scopolamine and sodium amytal are the two drugs which thus
far have been used in an effort to obtain scientifically from the sus-
pected individual his own version of his participation in, or inno-
cence of, the crime under investigation. Scopolamine, administered
by subcutaneous injections, has been used frequently in obstetrical
cases under the commonly known name of "twilight sleep." In fact,
it was in such a case that its "truth-telling" effects were first noticed
by Dr. R. E. House as possessing possibilities for use in criminal
investigations." Sodium amytal, administered intravenously, is an-
other anaesthetic in general use in medical profession.41
40While attending to a woman at childbirth, a Dr. R. E. House of Ferris,
Texas, requested an attendant (in a private residence) to look for scales with
which to weigh the new-born infant. The attendant replied that he did not
know where they were. Immediately, the mother, while under the influence
of scopolamine, spoke up and gave the desired information-telling just where
they could be found. This incident prompted Dr. House to experiment with
scopolamine, in order to ascertain whether it possessed any possibilities for
application in criminal investigations. House, "The Use of Scopolamine in
Criminology," 2 Am. J. Police Sci. 328 (1931), reprinted from the Texas State
Journal of Medicine (Sept., 1922).4 Experiments have been conducted lately in order to determine the thera-
peutic value of sodium amytal in serious psychotic cases. The beneficial in-
fluences of long periods of sleep as produced by this drug have been con-
sidered responsible for some of the good results obtained in a few such
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The policeman with his "third degree" and the scientific investi-
gator with his "truth-serum" are both working toward a common
objective. Each recognizes the fact that in the mind of the suspect
is locked the correct knowledge of the truth in every case. Both
attempt to obtain the desired information by direct methods-by
temporarily destroying in the brain the power of reason, imagina-
tion, and determination. But the officer of the law does it by brute
force-with its attendant results of bodily injury, mental suffering,
and not infrequently death itself; whereas the scientist uses nothing
but a painless anaesthetic which leaves no disagreeable after effects,
either mental or physical.
According to Dr. House, the successful use of scopolamine in
criminology is based upon the fact that a feeble stimulus is capable
of setting in operation nerve impulses which are extremely potent in
their effect. A few injections of the drug will depress the cerebrum
of the brain to such an extent that the stimulus of a question can
go only to the hearing cells, from which an answer is automatically
sent back, because the power of reason is inhibited more than the
power of hearing.**
Up to the time of his death in 1930, Dr. House had conducted
several hundred scopolamine experiments-in many of which he pro-
cured the release of accused and convicted individuals who were
subsequently proved innocent 4 3-- and his very conservative estimate
of success was fifty, per cent accuracy. Dr. House's findings were
presented before medical societies and criminological bodies, his ser-
vices always being offered without cost. He worked diligently to
interest others in carrying on similar research and to make them
realize that scopolamine offered a new and valuable means of crime
detection. He realized that his "truth-serum" was not absolutely
cases of psychopathic individuals. See Lindemann, "Psychological Changes in
Normal and Abnormal Individuals Under the Influence of Sodium Amytal,"
11 Am. Jour. Psychiatry 1083 (1932). Dr. Lindemann noted that in the normal
individuals tested they all experienced a "feeling of well-being and serenity,
a desire to communicate, to be every person's good friend, a grateful appre-
ciation for the kindness and goodness of the persons of their environment
or willingness to speak about very personal problems usually not spoken of to
strangers." Ibid., p. 1086.42The same principle accounts for the loss or partial loss of memory
in old age. "In old age, the cortical cells of the cerebrum are inhibited in
their functions because the dendrites, with their synapses, shrink. The cortical
cells do not then readily transmit thought to their neighboring thought cells,
to complete what is called memory. That is why old people apparently live
in the past and do not remember recent events with ease. A similar condi-
tion will be found in the brain of a person under the influence of scopolamine,
except that instead of shrinkage of the synapses there is a temporary con-
traction." House, op. cit. supra note 40 at p. 333.43Larson, op. cit. supra note 16.
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accurate, as could hardly be expected because of the human element
involved. And for that reason he suggested that although every sus-
pect believed guilty by a prosecuting attorney should be compelled
to submit to the test, only such evidence obtained as could be posi-
tively corroborated should be used against him."
At the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, scopolamine ex-
periments have been conducted with fairly satisfactory results. One
case in particular is worthy of special mention. The circumstances
and evidence surrounding the death of a man failed to sub-
stantiate his common-law wife's theory of suicide. Suspicion was
directed at both the wife and a person identified as her paramour.
The latter was so insistent in professing his innocence of the crime
that he consented to take a scopolamine test.4 5 While under the
influence of the drug the suspect insisted that he did not kill the
deceased. But when asked what he did with the pistol after the
deceased had been shot he declared that he threw it into a river. He
also stated that he covered the body with branches. At this point
the investigators were in a quandary, because obviously nothing like
this could have taken place in the instant case (the body having been
found in bed with a pistol at its side). For that reason the ques-
tions were repeated. The subject then answered that he hid the gun
in a patch of heather in a town in Ontario, Canada. Concerning
the present crime, however, he continued to express hii innocence.
When he regained consciousness the investigators-seeking an ex-
planation for the unrelated details of perhaps another crime-re-
minded him about the time he covered a body with branches. Upon
hearing this the man's face paled. Then someone suggested the mur-
der in Ontario. At this point the suspect became convinced that all
his past secrets had been divulged, and he agreed to confess to every-
thing. He told how the husband in the instant case arrived home and
found him there as an unwelcome guest; of the struggle between the
two; and of the wuife shooting her husband, without the paramour
knowing of her intention to do this. The suspect then continued to
confess his guilt regarding the two previous murders about which
the investigators knew nothing at all prior to the test. A communica-
tion with Ontario authorities disclosed the fact that this particular
"House, "Why Truth Serum Should Be Made Legal," 42 Medico-Legal
Jour. 138 (1925).
45The innocent person will readily submit to either scopolamine or the
"lie-detector" tests, and ordinarily the guilty individual dares not refuse what
he considers a useless test anyway, for fear of such refusal being interpreted
as an admission of guilt.
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individual was wanted there for the very murder he so unconsciously
described while under the influence of scopolamine. 46
One investigator has asserted that better results are obtainable
with sodium amytal than with scopolamine, because of the constant
and prolonged duration of the state of mind induced by sodium
amytal.4 7  But his research, confined to a limited number of cases of
non-criminal nature, has not been verified as yet. While it may
be true that another more effective "truth-telling" drug is available,
the results thus far obtained in scopolamine cases are indeed very
encouraging."8
Decisions.
The only appellate court decision upon the subject, State v.
Hudson,4 9 involved the admissibility of a physician's testimony con-
cerning evidence alleged to have been obtained from the accused him-
self while under the influence of a "truth-serum," presumably scopo-
lamine. The evidence was rejected.
A comparison should be made between the attitude of the Mis-
souri court in this case and that found in the opinions of the federal
court in the Frye case and of the Wisconsin court in the Bohner
case. But by way of partial justification for the court's attitude in
the instant- case, as expressed in the following quotation, it should
be noted that the Missouri court was not informed as to the nature
of the "truth-serum," and the circumstances surrounding the pro-
cedure for its introduction were none too favorable for the admission
of almost any scientific evidence, regardless of its reliability.
"It was sought to introduce in evidence the deposition of a doctor
residing elsewhere, who testified to the effect that he had administered to
the defendant what he termed a 'truth-telling serum,' and that while under
its influence the defendant had denied his guilt. Testimony of this char-
46See Wigmore, Principles of Judicial Proof (1931) 610 for a discussion
of scopolamine tests, and in particular for a quoted letter written to Pro-
fessor Wigmore by a prosecuting attorney in Alabama who describes his use
of scopolamine in the solution of a series of serious crimes in Birmingham,
Alabama. Also see an article in an English Medical Journal, 215 The Lancet
990 (1928), discussing a case in Hawaii where a confession is supposed to
have been obtained from a scopolamine subject, who was subsequently proved
innocent by virtue of another person's normal confession.
47Lorenz, "Criminal Confessions Under Narcosis," 31 Wis. Med. J. 245
(1932).
4SThe results of experimentation with scopolamine indicate that in ex-
perimental cases the drug produces truth-telling effects in practically every
instance. In actual cases, however, positive results have been obtained in
approximately fifty per cent of the cases. Nevertheless, the fact that any
results are obtainable warrants its use under any circumstances.
49289 S. W. 920 (Mo. 1926). See note in 12 St. Louis L. Rev. 215
(1927).
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acter-barring the sufficient fact that it cannot be otherwise classified
than as a self-serving declaration-is, in the present state of human
knowledge, unworthy of serious consideration. We are not told from
what well this serum is drawn or in what alembic its alleged truth-com-
pelling powers are distilled. Its origin is as nebulous as its effect is
uncertain. A belief in its potency, if it has any existence, is confined to
the modern Caliostros, who still, as Balsamo did of old, cozen the cred-
ulous for a quid pro quo, by inducing them to believe in the magic powers
of philters, potions and cures by faith. The trial court therefore, whether
it assigned a reason for its action or not, ruled correctly in excluding this
clap-trap from the consideration of the jury."50
Since the evidence obtainable by the use of a "truth-serum" is
of testimonial nature, it would be inadmissible if the test were con-
ducted without the defendant's consent. However, there should be
no constitutional objection to its admissibility where the examination
is made with full consent, and with knowledge of its nature and
purpose. One writer has suggested that If it became generally
accepted as a reliable eliminator of deception, the courts could, and
would, admit "truth-serum" confessions obtained prior to trial, since
after all it is the factor of unreliability that chiefly bars the forced
confession under present conditions.,1
C. Hypnotism:
The phenomenon of hypnotism, though frequently associated
with occult practices, is recognized by psychologists as being nothing
more than a state of heightened suggestiblity.5
2
Because of the fact that an individual in a hypnotic state will
act according to instructions given him at the time, it has been
thought possible to hypnotize a witness or an accused, instruct him
to tell the truth and then question him concerning the crime under
investigation. But since the art itself is based upon suggestibility,
an interrogator would have to be extremely cautious of the manner
in which he presents his questions, to avert the inherent danger of
unintentional? falsifying the subject's narration. Moreover, the
possibilities of hypnotism are limited to those persons susceptible
to hypnotic influence.5
Decisions.
Several attempts have been made to introduce evidence obtained
through hypnotism, but in each instance the courts have rejected any
50289 S. W. 921.
51See McCormick, op. cit. supra note 21 at p. 502.
52Burtt, Legal Psychology (1931) 133.
33See Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 46 at p. 611.
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such testimony. In a California case, State v. Ebanks," the defend-
ant, on trial for murder, called a witness supposed to be an expert
hypnotist, who offered to testify that he had hypnotized the defend-
ant and that under the hypnotic influence the defendant denied his
guilt. The trial court refused to admit the testimony on the ground
that this would be an "illegal defense," since the "law of the United
States does not recognize hypnotism." The appellate court disposed
of the case rather quickly by stating that "we shall not stop to argue
the point, and only add the court was right." 5"
In a recent Canadian case, Rex v. Booherr" the Crown employed
a hypnotist for the purpose of obtaining from the accused a confes-
sion concerning the murder for which he had been indicted. After
several visits by the hypnotist, the defendant expressed a desire to
confess and he did confess some time thereafter. Application was
made by the Crown to admit the confession in evidence, but it was
rejected on the ground that it may have been induced by the hyp-
notism, and therefore of an involuntary nature and consequently
inadmissible.
5 7
54117 Cal. 652, 49 Pac. 1049, 40 L. R. A. 269 (1898).
55It is interesting in this connection to note the language used in State v.
Exam, 138 N. C. 599, 50 S. E. 283 (1905), where the prosecution had asked
the defendant's wife on cross-examination whether or not she had ever been
hypnotized by her husband, whereupon the witness replied in the affirmative.
Upon appeal this question was held to be a proper one, since it merely went
to the purpose of affecting the credibility of the witness. The appellate court,
however, made this statement: "While this subject of hypnotism has re-
ceived to some extent 'judicial recognition,' in the language of one of the
briefs, the sources of its power and the extent of its influence, are in the
main, unknown, and we must hesitate to enter on such a field in search of
error."
51(1928) 4 D. L. R. 795.57"In the principal case, where there was evidence that the accused might
have been in a post-hypnotic state when making the confession, the court was
doubtless correct in excluding the admission, as the authorities on hypnotism
seem to agree that its use for such purpose is unreliable, as the subject can
be made to say anything, and will often lie even under honest questioning."
17 Cal. L. Rev. 311, 312 (1929). See in this connection: Bannuster, "Hypnotic
Influence in Criminal Cases," 51 Albany L. J. 87, 88 (1895). See note on this
case, and also collection of citations to scientific publications concerning the
reliability of hypnotism for this purpose: 42 Harv. L. Rev. 704 (1929).
The question as to the admissibility of confessions while asleep also has
been before the courts. In People v. Robinson, 19 Cal. 41 (1861), the trial
court permitted a witness to testify as to what the defendant had said in
his sleep concerning the murder. This was held erroneous upon appeal:
"If the defendant was asleep, the inference is that be was not conscious of
what he was saying, and the words spoken by him in that condition con-
stituted no evidence of guilt." Ibid., p. 42. A witness in State v. Morgan,
35 W. Va. 260, 13 S. E. 385 (1891), was permitted to testify that while the
defendant was in bed (whether asleep or not the witness could not say)
she exclaimed "I only consented to his death, and they gave him the poison."
The appellate court said that if the defendant were asleep at the time then
the exclamation was useless.
